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Abstract 
Four years ago, gas prices in the United States approached record highs at nearly $4 per 
gallon, all the while politicians argued about the causes and solutions. President Obama tried 
to calm the oil and financial markets, announcing on March 30, 2011 a goal that has tantalized 
presidents since Richard Nixon: to attain independence from foreign energy sources by 
reducing oil imports by more than one-third by 2025, a milestone that could reconfigure the 
U.S’ economy, geopolitics, and more. The U.S.’ dependence on foreign petroleum is widely 
considered a national security risk due to the volatility of oil and gas prices, supply-demand 
imbalances, and threats of sudden and more severe supply disruptions. For four decades, as 
U.S. energy consumption and imports increased, production fell, prompting the question: is 
rising oil and gas production in the U.S. likely to alter the four-decades-old debate 
surrounding energy independence in the U.S. and beyond, and if so, how and with what 
consequences to international energy markets? This paper evaluates the geopolitics of the 
U.S. shale gas revolution and its implications for international energy policy. 
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1. Introduction 
The shale gas revolution has fundamentally transformed energy markets domestically and 
abroad. Rising production has led to falling gas and oil prices in the U.S., while Europe, in 
contrast, is paying four to five times more for its natural gas and becoming one of the biggest 
importers of U.S. coal. As recently as five or six years ago this turnabout seemed improbable, 
with many analysts calling for rapid growth in renewable energy investment as the best means 
by which to wean the nation from its dependence on imported oil. Even then, such investment 
seemed far-fetched as the liquidity crisis worsened during the 2008-2012 global recession, 
forcing the federal government to institute stringent fiscal and monetary stimulus to stabilize 
the financial market and institutions. Taken together, the shale gas revolution represents the 
maturation of industry-friendly policies started under President Bush and continued during the 
Obama Administration. These policies supported the introduction of advanced technologies 
such as hydraulic fracturing, tight-oil extraction, horizontal drilling, innovative industrial 
software and other digital solutions, which have allowed production companies to 
economically extract oil and gas from previously inaccessible or financially infeasible shale 
rock formations with breathtaking speed. Most tantalizingly, this is a story of the triumph of a 
combination of economics of energy (operating by its own rules of supply and demand), the 
power of government-funded research and development (R&D), and getting the relationship 
right between the government and private sectors. 
 
2. The Shale Oil and Gas Boom 
In both the U.S. and abroad, rising shale gas production stands to raise the prospects for 
greater use of natural gas, an outcome that will exert significant influence on the structure of 
the global gas market. Cheap natural gas prices will help displace fuels associated with greater 
carbon intensity and higher air pollution, such as coal and oil. These low prices have also 
been an engine of growth in the U.S., stimulating local economic booms in places like 
Oklahoma, Texas, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania. It is now a well-established fact that 
increased shale gas production in the U.S. has had a ripple effect on other energy markets 
abroad through displacements of supplies in global trade as well as by fostering greater 
interest in shale resource potential, and it is expected these impacts will expand over time. 
According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), in 2013, about 9.35 trillion cubic 
feet of dry natural gas was produced in the U.S., representing about 39% of total dry natural 
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gas produced directly from shale deposits.1 The U.S. is well on its way to becoming self-
sufficient in oil and gas, and according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), forecasts on 
global energy trends show it could overtake Saudi Arabia as the world's biggest supplier of 
hydrocarbons by 2020.2 
 
These developments have exerted pressure on the global energy markets as evidenced by a 
flood of oil from the U.S., the slowing economic growth in China and Asia in general and the 
falling oil prices. The result is heightened discord at the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), which has spawned competition for new markets by producers 
even as Middle East turmoil frays political alliances. Revelations about the existence of 
technically—and possibly commercially—viable shale gas resources have continued with 
smashing success in Europe, Argentina, China, India, Australia, and elsewhere. Together, 
some of these developments could, in principle, have significant geopolitical ramifications 
thus exerting a powerful influence on U.S. energy and foreign policy. 
 
3. Growth Generators 
Indeed, a particularly attractive investment environment has facilitated the U.S. shale 
renaissance, and spurring this production boom are the sector’s private gas producers, rather 
than the government, who make investment decisions. This year, intent on realizing even 
better performance, gas producers are particularly focused on cost reduction and economies of 
scale. Perhaps even more important, the well-developed open markets in the U.S. have 
facilitated efficient trading in shale gas to the highest bidder, conditions that are distinctly 
lacking in Europe and Chinese gas markets. Equally, the strong-form market efficiency that 
exists in the U.S. gas industry lets producers benefit from long-term contracting and its 
variants to hedge long-term systemic risks since they can sell their production several years in 
advance and use those contacts as income hedging instruments when they seek financing for 
their projects. In the U.S. gas industry, resources are also mostly owned by individual 
investors, not governments, thus keeping politics a step removed from gas market 
development. 
 
These features have offered both security of supply and economic benefits to the U.S. Save 
for Canada, none of these growth generators that have spawned the U.S. shale gas boom are 
present in other countries with high technically recoverable shale resources. However, it is far 
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too early to assume the shale gas boom will not materialize beyond U.S. borders; there are no 
physical principles that prevent techniques and technologies developed in the U.S.—including 
enhanced oil recovery and horizontal drilling combined with hydraulic fracturing—from 
being applied around the world to extract technically recoverable shale. 
 
4. Triumvirate Mechanisms  
Geopolitical consequences of the soaring shale gas supplies for international energy policy 
have concentrated on the triumvirate mechanisms of the price of oil, the changing patterns of 
trade in the global energy market, and the integration of natural gas markets. Whether or not 
the shale gas boom transcends North America or is replicated in other regions of the world, 
these factors remain a tantalizing possibility. Here they are discussed in detail. 
 
The first mechanism through which policymakers imagine the U.S. shale gas boom will 
upturn global energy markets and geopolitics is through its impact on oil prices. In January 
2008, the price of oil hovered around $90 per barrel. By the end of the year, oil prices had 
plunged to under $35 per barrel but not before it peaked at $147 per barrel that July. Six years 
later, in January 2015, both Brent and U.S. crude futures dropped to $47.93 per barrel on the 
New York Mercantile Exchange, a 5½-year low amid continuing concerns about a global 
supply glut and the pace of economic growth. Oil futures concerns forced Saudi Arabia’s state 
oil company Saudi Aramco to cut its light oil prices to the U.S. by 60 cents per barrel for the 
February delivery, raising the prospects of what observers consider the beginning of a price 
battle to regain market share lost to American shale producers. Like other members of OPEC, 
Saudi Arabia dislikes that kind of volatility since too low prices result in enormous financial 
problems for many exporting countries and their economies depend on oil trading between 
$100 and $130 per barrel. However, according to a study on modern oil prices and the impact 
of new technology led by James Bartis of the RAND Corporation, oil shale will become 
profitable at an oil price between $80 and $110 per barrel, with further cost decreases as the 
industry gains experience.3 
 
In any case, there is no current consensus on the future price of oil because these estimates 
reflect different assumptions about technology, policy, demographics, lifestyles, and global 
economic growth, all of which result in varying future supply and demand growth projections 
and different prices for oil. Moreover, since oil is traded globally, prices are determined by 
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the total global supply and not necessarily by how much is produced by a single country. For 
instance, in 2008, as the price of oil went on an incredible roller-coaster ride, Saudi Arabia 
stepped in as the prices fell from $115 per barrel to about $60 in less than six months. And 
guess what happened? Nothing. The fact of the matter is that other members of OPEC did not 
follow Saudi Arabia in propping up the prices, exposing the Saudis on their inability to single-
handedly control global oil prices. Additionally, though U.S. oil production was higher in 
2010 than in 2009, the prices of oil were higher too. The big question is what will be the 
impact of U.S. shale production on the global price of oil? 
 
While it may not be possible to adequately predict long-term implications of the U.S. shale 
revolution, it is already evident that increased U.S. oil output means the potential to exert 
downward pressure on the price of oil. Previously, when oil production rose in the U.S., oil 
output of many OPEC countries fell. Trevor Houser and Shashank Mohan of Rhodium Group, 
have analysed the economic implications of the U.S. shale oil and gas boom, and concluded 
that without this boom in the U.S. and Canada, the global price of oil would trade 3-11% 
higher from 2013 to 2035.4 Given the temptation of many oil exporting countries to maximize 
their revenues from oil sales by restraining production and propping up prices, a sustained 
drop in the price of oil could have major political ramifications. As further volatility in oil 
prices is projected, this is likely to hammer energy stocks and currencies exposed to crude 
exports, as well as intensify risks to oil-dedicated sovereign wealth funds such as Saudi 
Arabia's Sanabil Al Saudia fund. 
 
Second, geopolitical implications of the shale boom relate to changing patterns of trade that 
are and will continue to upturn global markets. The push for U.S. exports of liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) has been strong and is likely to increase in the coming years as the number of 
companies applying for permits to build terminals expands, transforming the U.S. into the 
number three LNG exporter after Qatar and Australia, according to IEA.5 Regionally, 
domestic supplies expansion in both Canada and the U.S. are expected to be sufficiently 
robust to move them to a position of joint self-sufficiency by 2020, according to EIA.6 
 
The long-term upside to the competitive American LNG export market, beyond the potential 
to shake up global markets, is the prospect to exert shifts in trade patterns as countries search 
for different pricing mechanisms and more market flexibility in the delivery terms. Signing up 
more companies for cheaper hub-priced LNG from the U.S. looks very attractive at the 
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current $3.07/MMBtu price levels. Already this has created some short-term friction for 
suppliers from Angolan and Nigerian LNG markets, who planned to supply U.S. markets, but 
no longer find a ready market in the U.S. as a result of the shale boom. Besides, development 
of an American LNG export market could also help insulate gas importing countries in Asia 
and Europe from political arm twisting by suppliers in the Middle East and Russia. A scenario 
that would not only be good for the economies of these consuming countries as a whole, but 
also for U.S. foreign policy, is freeing up would-be allies to actively work with the U.S. rather 
than holding back for fear of political and economic retaliations. Internationally, there is a 
strong perception that energy trade is at the core of political relationships, and will continue to 
be as the American energy renaissance continues. 
 
The final implication of the U.S. shale boom on global energy policy and geopolitics is its 
potential to fundamentally transform the natural gas markets. Following the 2011 events at the 
Daiichi nuclear power facility in Fukushima, Japan, in combination with soaring U.S. shale 
gas supplies and high oil prices, a significant initial widening of the gap between natural gas 
prices in the Americas, Europe, and Asia occurred, reaching their low point in April, 2012. 
The expected emergence of other regions as significant LNG supplies to the world market 
alongside North America, including Australia, Argentina, South Africa and parts of East 
Africa such as Mozambique and Tanzania could theoretically, have the opposite effect of 
bridging regional gas prices. 
 
For over a decade, natural gas prices have been characterized in the U.S. by high price 
volatility and supply-demand imbalances. In October 2014, the Henry hub natural gas spot 
market was trading in the $3.8/MMBtu to $4/MMBtu range. Based on the Henry hub 
averages, natural gas spot prices averaged $4.45/MMBtu in 2014 and it is estimated at around 
$3.84/MMBtu this year, according to the EIA.7 Although price differentials will remain 
between different regional markets because of transportation costs, it is likely that big 
importers targeting the shale boom such as South Korea and Japan will gain from having 
alternate suppliers with lower costs, a development that will continue to benefit these 
economies so long as the transformation in the natural gas industry endures. 
 
Either way, signs of geopolitical transformation of the soaring U.S. shale gas supplies are 
already evident beyond American shores: discord in OPEC and rising imports of U.S. coal for 
power generation in Europe. It is also uncertain which OPEC member could effectively play 
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the role of “swing supplier” to guarantee less volatility of oil prices. But the shale boom is 
still too new for anyone to definitively make any predictions of what a stable price would 
mean for the global energy markets. Therefore, the breadth and depth of the geopolitical 
implications of the shale boom will largely depend on two factors: sustainability of U.S. shale 
production and its associated value chains, and the extent to which this boom can be 
replicated beyond U.S. borders. 
 
5. The Promise of Expansion in Shale Energy 
Could oil and gas prices have fallen over the last decade as they have without rapid growth in 
shale? Open access implemented two decades ago through the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) Order 436 which mandated third party access to gas transmission 
pipelines, stagnant coal prices, and a positive financial foundation of the gas industry helped 
to lower the prices, but most credit goes to the maturation of industry-friendly policies and 
technologies leading to shale boom. Technology is driving efficiencies, resulting in lower 
costs to drill each well. The evidence clearly indicates a flourishing global gas market. Fuel 
switching of coal for less carbon intensive natural gas in power generation has significantly 
grown with shale development and is likely to continue in other regional gas markets, 
especially in Europe and Asia. This would lead to better economical viability to undertake 
further extraction of the technically recoverable shale gas supplies. 
 
Cheap gas prices compared to coal and petroleum is now a reality as daily gas volumes 
transported has significantly increased with the expansion in shale production. While the 
geopolitical premium that can accrue to the international energy markets from the shale boom 
in the U.S. are significant, investments in the industry, especially to support operations and 
efficiency improvement of the nearly 10,000 small producers, remain puny, sparse, and 
uncoordinated. Given the transformative potential of the shale boom for U.S foreign policy as 
well as its energy standing, it would be remiss for American policymakers not to turn the 
current energy renaissance into geopolitical heft. 
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